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ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose a data dissemination platform that sup-
ports data security and different privacy levels even when the plat-
form and the data are hosted by untrusted infrastructures. The
proposed system aims at enabling an application ecosystem that
uses off-the-shelf trusted platforms (in this case, Intel SGX), so that
users may allow or disallow third parties to access the live data
stream with a specific sensitivity-level. Moreover, this approach
does not require users to manage the encryption keys directly. Our
experiments show that such an approach is indeed practical for
medium scale systems, where participants disseminate small vol-
umes of data at a time, such as in smart grids and IoT environments.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Privacy-preserving protocols;Hard-
ware security implementation;Data anonymization and san-
itization; Privacy protections;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The “digital transformation” enables an increase in productivity
and quality of life through the usage of information technologies.
The growing number of data sources combined with analytics tech-
niques that generate actionable information from a large volume
of raw data have a strong impact in all aspects of our daily lives.
Nevertheless, these opportunities are also coupled with several
challenges, especially the need for affordable and scalable infras-
tructures to hosts data and applications, as well as the mitigation
of risks related to the leakage of private data.
On the one hand, the challenge of providing scalable infrastruc-
tures has been addressed by the advances in cloud computing. In
contrast to the situation in the last couple of decades, where de-
velopers of novel applications would have to consider the risk of
investing in hardware infrastructures, new applications start to-
day in the cloud, where the cost is proportional to the resources
actually used (at the granularity of cents) and the infrastructure
can be scaled within minutes. In addition, there are hundreds of
cloud providers that offer more than simple computing and stor-
age resources paid by the hour. These providers offer higher level
platform services to ease the development of applications. This
combination of simplicity and cost efficiency has promoted the
cloud as the de facto environment where applications are hosted.
On the other hand, cloud providers are an obvious and attractive
target for attacks that aim to steal data or compromise applications.
There are many reasons that increase the risk of data leakage when
using cloud infrastructures [7], for example: (i) vulnerabilities in the
infrastructure may allow attackers to access data outside their VMs
or tenants; (ii) employers may have access to raw data and use these
access to steal data; or (iii) cyber-espionage may compromise the
confidential data of companies and even governments. At the same
time, cloud platform services store increasingly more sensitive
information, such as voice snippets, like in AWS Lex1, and face
images, as in AWS Rekognition2.
While there are many guidelines for building cloud native appli-
cations, if the infrastructure cannot be trusted as are the cases listed
above protecting data becomes challenging. Encrypting data at rest,
1https://aws.amazon.com/lex/?nc2=h_a1
2https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/?nc1=h_ls
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using good encryption keys, and limiting the scope and permissions
of the users cannot protect from insider attacks or remote attacks in
which the attacker has manage to compromise the physical host. In
such scenarios, some approaches, such as homomorphic encryption,
are effective even in such cases as the data can be kept encrypted
at all times, even during processing. Nevertheless, it is very hard to
compile generic functions into an application that uses homomor-
phic encryption. Finally, the usage of secure co-processors have
been considered for decades, but required specialized hardware
that was typically not widespread.
More recently, the idea of having secure coprocessors have
gained additional traction. It started on the domain of embedded
devices with ARM Trustzone, but with SGX has reached common
workstations and servers3. Intel SGX enables code to be executed
in a secure enclave in a way that its data is protected even from
the operating system. In addition, it supports attestation, where
the code running in such secure enclave has its signature validated.
After SGX, other mainstream processor manufacturers, such as
AMD, have then also proposed similar approaches and with the
amount of sensitive data being kept in our machines, the trend is
that these hardware technologies will become ubiquitous.
In this paper, we address this problem by exploiting tools that
enable the usage of SGX to host communication and processing
systems. We than propose a system that combines and extend tools
such as Intel SGX, SCONE [3], and SCBR [22] in a way that en-
ables data producers to be aware of the entities that are going to
consume its data (through remote attestation) and even restrict the
level of granularity that these entities can consume. Through this
combination of features, it is viable to produce an ecosystem of
applications in which a data source produces very sensitive data
that is repeatedly anonymized or aggregated by trusted entities.
Less sensitive versions of the data can then be consumed by less
trustworthy (or even untrusted) applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
tools and concepts that are fundamental for the approach presented
and a running example that will help illustrate the approach de-
scribed is Section 3. After that, Section 4 presents experiments of
the proof-on-concept implementation. The paper is concluded with
related work in Section 5 and some final remarks in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a brief description of the key concepts
to aid the understanding of the context and the components that
will be used in our proposed architecture.
2.1 Intel SGX: Software Guard eXtensions
Securing data in order to guarantee its privacy and integrity is
highly desired by end users aiming to protect sensitive information
from malicious attacks. Some approaches that attempt to provide
this security, specially on cloud environments, lack the ability to
protect the application data from software with higher privilege
levels such as hypervisors [25, 26]. In this context, Intel’s Software
Guard eXtensions (SGX) [10, 11] has emerged, a hardware-based
3Currently, processors with Intel SGX support are the sixth and newer generations
processors of the Intel Core family and some recent Intel Xeon processors, such as the
E3-1200 family, fifth generation and newer.
technology that ensures privacy and data integrity, protecting ap-
plication code even if components such as the OS, hypervisor, etc.
are untrusted.
In order to achieve this goal, Intel SGX provides a set of instruc-
tions to allow changes in memory access, creating protected areas
named enclaves [19]. The enclave page cache (EPC) is where ap-
plication code and data reside, managed by CPU access control
policies, which prevent attacks against its content. Code outside an
enclave cannot access enclave memory. However, enclave code can
access untrusted memory outside the EPC, being responsible for
verifying the integrity of this data.
Intel SGX also offers local and remote attestation features [1],
which can be performed by a third-party to guarantee that an
expected piece of software is securely running inside an enclave,
on a known SGX-capable platform. Remote attestation, used in this
paper, requires asymmetric cryptography, since the verification
comes from outside the platform, and a special component, the
quoting enclave. This enclave is responsible for creating the Intel
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) key used for signing attestations to
be certified by an EPID backend infrastructure. Only the quoting
enclave knows this EPID key, which is connected to the version of
the processor’s firmware.
Possible usage of Intel SGX [5, 15] includes authentication tech-
nologies, online financial transactions, logging of user activities
and personal information, video conferencing, and many others.
Besides these examples on client machines, it is also possible to use
SGX to protect backend applications. For instance, VC3 [23] runs
distributed MapReduce computations in the cloud guaranteeing
data privacy and ensuring the correctness and completeness of
results. VC3 uses SGX to isolate memory regions, and to deploy
new protocols that secure distributed MapReduce computations.
2.2 SCONE: Secure Linux Containers
With the advent of SGX and the growing use of containers for
hosting applications, new approaches to handle security and privacy
aspects of such structures have emerged. Here, we use SCONE [3],
a Secure CONtainer Environment for Docker that uses SGX to
protect given container processes, using SGX protected enclaves.
This mechanism offers secure containers together with insecure
operational systems, and does that in a transparent way to already
existent Docker environments. For this to happen, it is only required
that the host machine has a SGX-capable Intel CPU and a Linux
SGX kernel driver4 installed.
Amongst the features offered by SCONE, there are (i) an asyn-
chronous system call interface to the host OS provided to container
processes, allowing them to perform system calls without having to
exit threads inside enclaves; (ii) support for transparent encryption
and authentication of data through a mechanism called shielding,
ensuring data integrity and confidentiality; (iii) no changes to the
application code being deployed, since SCONE’s special compiler
automatically prepares the code to be SGX-compatible; (iv) simple
Docker integration relying on a secure container image specially
built for this purpose.
4https://01.org/intel-softwareguard-eXtensions (visited: June 05, 2017).
Besides that, providing a secure container requires a SCONE
client extension to enable the creation of configuration files, spawn-
ing of such containers and for secure communication with them.
During container startup, a configuration file is necessary contain-
ing keys for encryption, application arguments and environment
variables. Also, the application code must be statically compiled
with its library dependencies and the SCONE library.
In general lines, SCONE provides secure containers maintaining
a small Trusted Computing Base (TCB) size, and reducing over-
heads naturally imposed by SGX enclave transitions, thanks to its
asynchronous system calls mechanism and custom kernel module.
2.3 Secure Content-Based Routing
Content-based routing (CBR) is a known paradigm for communica-
tion between distributed processes that routes messages based on
their content rather than by a specified destination. This allows for
more scalability, dynamicity and flexibility, besides removing from
the sender application the knowledge of where sent messages will
end up. Such publish/subscribe communication mechanism [12, 20]
can be improved by adding an extra security layer to the process,
since in this scenario, the router has access to the content of the
messages and subscriptions, representing a threat to the data confi-
dentiality and integrity which might be compromised.
Considering this, here we use a Secure Content-Based Routing
mechanism [22] that relies on the SGX technology previously de-
scribed to provide a routing engine in an enclave. We add to SCBR
features a protocol for exchanging cryptographic keys between
both ends of the communication chain, producers and consumers
of smart metering data, and the routing engine. As a consequence,
because publications and subscriptions are encrypted and signed,
the system raises protection levels against malicious attacks that
could compromise the data being exchanged.
2.4 Python-SGX interpreter
The Intel SGX SDK is a development toolkit available only for C
and C++ languages. This means only applications written in these
languages can be adapted to run and communicate with enclaves.
This presents itself as a limitation for the Intel SGX technology as
porting code is an obstacle and may lead to additional bugs.
Among popular programming languages, Python deserves spe-
cial attention. This year, Python was considered the Top 1 pro-
gramming language in the 2017 Programming Languages ranking
promoted by IEEE5. Very popular softwares are written in Python as
well, such as OpenStack, YouTube, DropBox, Instagram and many
others.
Using Intel SDK to implement SGX applications might require
extra effort to port existing code, or even creating new pieces of
software. For this purpose, SCONE provides a modified C compiler,
based on the libmusl6 library. This compiler, named sgxmusl-gcc7,
automatically generates the object code to be executed inside SGX
enclaves, making it easier to have hardware protected applications
5http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/the-2017-top-programming-
languages
6https://www.musl-libc.org/
7https://sconedocs.github.io
ready to run. However, the sgxmusl-gcc compiler is obviously re-
stricted to C code, and possibly with GCC supported languages,
such as Fortran, through the libgfortran library8.
In the light of this, and the increasing use of the Python language
mentioned before, enabling Python code to run in SGX becomes
attractive. We then leverage the sgxmusl-gcc to produce a modified
Python interpreter. Our Python interpreter is compiled with the
sgxmusl-gcc and extended to interpret and attest Python code inside
SGX enclaves. All things considered, this approach increases the
range of applications that can be executed using SGX as well as the
number of developers capable of leveraging the technology.
However, the sgxmusl-gcc compiler has a few limitations. One of
the major limitations is the fact that dynamic linking of libraries is
not allowed. All the system libraries, such as openssl9 and ncurses10,
together with the native Python modules required by the user’s
application, should be statically linked upon Python-SGX building.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to include all native Python mod-
ules at once. Static linking requires the code from all the libraries
to be included in the binary file, causing a large memory overhead
upon execution. Adding extra code also introduces the risk for bugs
in the generated code. In practice, limiting imports is not neces-
sarily critical as most applications, even highly complex ones, are
unlikely to use too many libraries. This observation is specially true
when considering the microservice approach, where functionally
is well divided into a large number of services.
When it comes to external libraries, there is a level of complexity
addedwhen they are not pure Python. By default, it is not possible to
interpret application code that requires such modules. However, we
managed to support some important ones as the PyCrypto11 library.
This Python cryptography toolkit provides a stable and trustworthy
base for writing Python code that requires cryptographic functions,
such as the AES-CTR encryption mode used in this paper. To make
the link possible, we had to introduce PyCrypto as a native Python
module. To do this, the PyCrypto library had to be modified to be
included in the Python-SGX source tree, and then able to be linked
as the rest of the native libraries.
In addition, we also use Python-SGX to interpret the code for
some of the components explained in Section 3.1, and we attest
them in a way that guarantees the code is the one expected by the
developer. We do this by introducing in the interpreter code checks
for the SHA-256 hash of the application code. The hash of the code
to be executed is calculated before the start of the interpretation and
checked against the hash provided during the SCONE attestation
process of the Python binary itself. In the big picture, Python-SGX
is considered trusted because it is previously attested by SCONE
and this trust is extended to the Python code executed over it.
In a summary, considering the above limitations, we managed
to make possible for complex applications written in Python to be
interpreted by our Python-SGX, and therefore, securely executed
inside SGX enclaves in a transparent way.
8https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/GFortran
9https://www.openssl.org/
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ncurses
11https://pypi.python.org/pypi/pycrypto
2.5 Application example: a smart metering
infrastructure
For detailing the approach proposed in this paper we consider a
smart metering use case. The motivation for such an application
scenario is that the availability of detailed power consumption in-
formation enables analytics that can reduce power consumption by
detecting anomalies and undesired configurations, recommending
actions that will result in more efficient usage of the electricity.
As an example, collecting measurements at each second may
enable the identification of individual appliances running in a con-
sumer’s unit. This is known as Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring
(NIALM) [6]. With this information, customized recommendations
can lead consumers to save considerable amounts of power [2].
Nevertheless, even without disaggregation, the usage of detailed
metering for home energy management systems [4] has proved its
value in practice.
On the negative side, providing detailed power consumption
information reveals much more than it may seem at the first glance.
Previous research has shown that even details on the multimedia
content in users’ TVs may be detected through detailed data [14].
It then becomes clear that even less information can reveal much
about the habits of individuals of a residence.
In a summary, having detailed power consumption is clearly use-
ful. Power utilities can use the data to better plan power generation
and to understand and, therefore, influence consumers. Consumers
may benefit from analytics approaches being executed over its data.
However, even with clear benefits, the data should not be trusted to
any application. In addition, not every customer will want to share
his data. Consequently, a system that enables users to have better
control over who access the data and reduces the risks of leakage
can be a seed for sophisticated privacy-aware applications not only
in smart grid infrastructures, but also in other smart cities and IoT
application domains.
3 PRIVACY-AWARE DATA DISSEMINATION
This section describes our data dissemination platform. It begins
by describing the basic components and then continues to describe
a simple publication workflow. The description ends by detailing
how the example introduced in Section 2 can be improved based
on the platform.
3.1 Components
3.1.1 Smart Meter. Smart meters are a key component for smart
grids. Such devices are responsible for collecting energy data of
households, buildings, and other environments, enabling customers
to reduce electricity costs by wisely monitoring their energy con-
sumption. A smart meter can read these fine-grained measurements
at specified time intervals, and communicate this information to a
utility provider. For future generations smart energy systems, it is
expected that not only the utility will consume this data, but also
third parties will offer applications that monitor consumption and
recommend efficiency actions, as discussed in Section 2.
In our scenario, we consider the Smart Meter component a device
that is able to directly or indirectly send data to a remote server. In
practice, because of regulatory or cost constraints this is typically
done indirectly, meters send data to gateways and these send the
data to a processing system at the utility. Nevertheless, because
of this indirect communication, there is much flexibility in the
implementation of the communication. In our proof-of-concept we
consider different meters that can be accessed through a wireless
or cabled network. We then consider that energy consumption
data is collected by a Metering Data Collector (MDC) component
that may be specific to an equipment model or brand and then the
measurements are forwarded to other systems.
3.1.2 Metering Data Collector. This component is responsible
for collecting energy consumption data from the smart meter device.
The MDC application connects to the device via a TCP/IP network
and retrieves new data every second. The communication protocol
may be specific to that device. Because the next component, named
Dispatcher, is untrusted, encryption is needed to guarantee some
security. In our use case, this untrusted component is the Dispatcher,
detailed below. This encryption is currently implemented using the
AES-CTR encryption mode (possibly a rotating key).
In addition, because the sole purpose of the key is to protect from
the untrusted dispatcher, there are two ways this key can be created
and managed: (i) the key is negotiated with the SCBR during the
attestation process (described below); (ii) the key will be generated
by the data source and shared with all trusted participants in the
system. As we will detail later, the first approach introduces higher
load to the SCBR, reducing its scalability. In contrast, the second
approach requires some periodic rotation of keys.
Because the MDC sees raw data it needs to be trusted. This trust
can be gained through certification and sealing (as the meters typi-
cally are) or through the usage of a trusted execution environment.
In our case we consider the second. Therefore, the MDC is executed
in a special Python interpreter that was generated with SCONE
(as detailed in Sections 2.2 and 2.4). By executing the MDC inside
an SGX enclave, we are able to validate this code before execution,
ensuring that only versions with the expected signatures will be
executed.
3.1.3 Dispatcher. In our scenario, the Dispatcher works as a
gateway, passing along the measurements received from the MDC
application to the message bus. Because the MDC may be limited
in functionality, the usage of the Dispatcher enables further flexi-
bility in the setup of the rest of the system. Furthermore, because
the Dispatcher does not need to be trusted, it has many more im-
plementation and deployment options. As an example, with an
untrusted dispatcher, it is trivial to change the message bus if SCBR
guarantees are not needed.
In our specific implementation, the communication with the
bus requires ZeroMQ12 connections and the Python-SGX inter-
preter has limited support for importing Python modules. As it
is likely to occur in practice, by using an indirection level we de-
couple a trusted component, the MDC, from the communication
protocol used by the data infrastructure running in the cloud. This
decoupling eliminates the need of reimplementing the bus’s com-
munication protocol, which would possibly add more complexity
to the proposed platform and its usage.
Thus, the Dispatcher simply implements a layer of communica-
tion with the bus via ZeroMQ and communicates with the MDC
12http://zeromq.org/
through simple sockets. Finally, the received encrypted measure-
ments are sent to the Secure Content-Based Routing (SCBR) com-
ponent.
3.1.4 Secure Content-Based Routing. The Secure Content-Based
Routing component follows the publish–subscribe paradigm [12],
in which senders of messages, named publishers, do not address
messages explicitly, but rather categorize such messages regardless
of which receivers, the subscribers, will be receiving them. From
the subscribers’ perspective, subscribers express interest in one or
more type of messages and receive the ones they are interested in,
regardless of their publishers.
Differently to other regular publish-subscribe middleware, SCBR
has a mode in which only the publisher can submit subscriptions to
its publications. We use this mode so that subscribers have to com-
municate with the publishers at the beginning. During this initial
communication, the publisher will attest the candidate consumer,
and if passed, it can handle encryption keys.
The SCBR bus securely routes messages between publishers
and subscribers, as detailed in Section 2.3. Its security and privacy-
awareness are consequence of the fact that the routing decisions
are taken inside SGX. In our use case, we consider that sensitive
information will carry its sensitivity level (in the Pub/Sub topic).
Depending on the choice on the encryption approach in the
MDC, as discussed above, there are two choices: (i) if the MDC
encryption key was negotiated with the SCBR, SCBR would decrypt
the data and this data would be disseminated unencrypted; (ii) if the
encryption key is negotiated with the trusted parties, the sensitive
information (e.g., the measurements is kept encrypted even within
the SCBR enclave), this could be useful for connecting systems that
store information, even if the systems themselves cannot read it.
Sent messages follow a specific header format, containing the
message type, or privacy level, and its encryption mode which can
also be plain-text. SCBR allows for configuring the security level of
its core, which can be set to use SGX or not. The bus uses the Intel
SDK tool in its implementation and, by enabling SGX, executes the
routing engine inside an enclave. From the client side, if the SGX
mode is required, it can be checked as the attestation process only
works if the SGX enclaves are in use.
3.1.5 Attestor. In the proposed platform, in order for consumers
to receive data from SCBR, besides being registered in the bus,
they need to be considered trusted and therefore, attested. With
this approach, the consumer knows how to decrypt the encrypted
measurements, and can have access to the published information.
The attestation process here follows the remote attestation pro-
tocol specified by SGX, as explained in Section 2.1, and uses the
Intel Attestation Service (IAS). The Attestor is then responsible for
mediating the attestation process of the consumers by the IAS, and
then, the encryption/decryption key exchange during attestation.
The process is further discussed in Section 3.2.
3.1.6 Aggregator. Aggregating individual measurements to pro-
duce full energy consumption reports and its respective billing is an
important feature desired by utility providers in a smart metering
scenario. Here, the Aggregator component serves this purpose and
aggregates measurements generating new aggregated energy data.
Time intervals may vary between minutes, hours, or months, but
Figure 1: Architecture of data dissemination platform for
smart metering infrastructures.
every message received by the Aggregator is an individual raw
measurement as previously published by the Smart Meters.
During initialization, theAggregator is attested by the IAS through
the Attestor, and is then able to decrypt the received messages. Af-
ter the key exchange, this component is also able to encrypt the
aggregated data to be published again into the SCBR bus and later
consumed by final consumers. In our implementation, this piece of
code was written using the Intel SDK.
3.1.7 Final Consumers. There can be many final consumers,
which are able to register to the SCBR bus and express interest
in a certain type of messages. For the registration, they need to
contact publishers and then will be attested by the IAS through the
Attestor. As a consequence, they will receive the key to decrypt
published messages. This piece of code is also developed using the
Intel SDK tool. An alternative is that the consumer requests public
data. In this case, the publisher would simply register it without
actual attestation.
3.2 Architecture Workflow
As seen in Figure 1, the flow starts with measurements being
recorded by Smart Meters. These data is then sent to the MDC
application, which is interpreted by the Python-SGX interpreter.
Python-SGX is attested by SCONE, and afterwards, can attest the
MDC component and guarantee that the SHA-256 hash of the ap-
plication code matches the hash provided during the SCONE attes-
tation process.
The MDC then collects measurements every second from the
Smart Meter, via a secure HTTPS channel, and encrypts them using
the AES-CTR encryption mode. The key used for encryption is
generated from an Initialization Vector (IV) and the respective
decryption key is handed in during the consumer’s attestation
process. The MDC then sends the encrypted measurements to the
Dispatcher via TCP sockets. To complete the publication flow, the
Dispatcher communicates via a ZeroMQ connection with the SCBR
bus, and publishes the encrypted measurement according to its
privacy level.
From the same figure we can also see that the bottom half of
the SCBR component represents the consumers interested in the
messages published by the Dispatcher. The figure illustrates two
types of consumers, Aggregators and Final Consumers, as described
in Section 3.1. In our scenario, we have one aggregator and a num-
ber of final consumers. All of them should first register to the bus
through the producers, and declare which type of messages they
are interested in. Upon registration, such consumers are attested by
the IAS through the Attestor component. This process is indicated
in Figure 1 by the yellow ticks over the arrows connecting the
consumers to the bus. When the attestation process is completed,
the consumers will receive the key able to decrypt the published en-
crypted messages. This shared key is sent encrypted by a symmetric
key also negotiated during the attestation.
From this point on, consumers are able to decrypt the messages
received from the SCBR bus. By definition, the aggregator receives
the encrypted raw measurements and aggregates them according
to specific time frames previously defined. These frames may vary
between seconds, hours, months, and so on. After the data is aggre-
gated, it can be encrypted or not, and published again to the SCBR
bus by the aggregator itself, which in this scenario also works as a
publisher. Upon publication, the privacy level of the information is
defined, and the final consumers receive them accordingly.
3.3 Securely aggregating measurements
As discussed in Section 2, we envisage a scenario where a meter
will collect detailed information that is valuable for many uses.
For example, a user may be interested in receiving customized
recommendations on how to reduce consumption. For that, it opts
in to an application that request access to its second-level data.
Another user, concerned about privacy, does not take part in such
application and allows only aggregated measurements (e.g., daily)
to be accessible.
For our running example, we classify the impact level about
criticality and sensitivity of aggregate data. We adjusted the FIPS
199 [21] model as an assessment criteria in the current example. The
security model for data aggregation classifies potential impact in
three levels: Low, Moderate or High. These levels can be interpreted
as follows:
(1) High impact characterizes private data (e.g., an individual
data collection from a particular smart meter), and the in-
formation must only be available to an aggregation system,
protected by enclaves, or to applications explicitly trusted
by producers (the smart meter owners). The risk of expo-
sure or data violation would be unacceptable, resulting in
severe or catastrophic impact or noncompliance with legal
requirements and loss of customer confidence.
(2) Moderated impact defines protected data (e.g., as a set of
local data aggregation from a collection of smart meters),
and the measurements should only be available to power
supplies. The risk of exposure or data violation would be
marginally acceptable, causing certain impact or reputation
losses on normal activity, with adverse effects on organiza-
tional operations, assets or individuals.
(3) Low impact identifies public data (e.g., as a set of aggregated
data from regional smart meters), and the information may
be available freely. The risk of exposure or data violation
would be acceptable for the energy company, resulting in
minimal impact on normal activity.
Thus, in our example we consider that meters high-frequency
measurements are published by the meters as high impact. These
data are subscribed to by the Aggregator and by the Consumer 1,
both have been explicitly trusted by the Smart Meter owner. The
Aggregator computes hourly averages from the consumer measure-
ments (e.g., for billing purposes, compatible with hour-of-the-day
tariffs) and regional hourly averages (e.g., for public viewing). These
two aggregations are published asmoderate and low-impact, respec-
tively. Consumer N subscribes to low-impact measurements and
receives these publications even though it cannot be attested, as it
is not running in an enclave.
4 EVALUATION
In this sectionwe discuss the experiments that validate the proposed
architecture. All experiments were executed in workstations with
an Intel Core SGX-enabled i7-6700 processor and 8 GB of RAM
running Ubuntu Linux 16.04 Xenial.
In the first set of experiments, we compare a simple aggregation
implemented with homomorphic encryption, which would also
enable trusted data processing in untrusted infrastructures, with
SGX (but without any other components of the proposed architec-
ture), and in pure C, without SGX. The implementation used in
the homomorphic encryption aggregation is based on the scheme
proposed by Busom et al [8]. The goal is to illustrate how the raw
SGX performance compares to a traditional approach that would
enable comparable benefits for running protected data analysis in
cloud environments, and to an approach that offers no security, but
also no overhead.
Because of the huge discrepancies in the overhead two sets of
tests were executed. The first compares homomorphic encryption
and Intel SGX and the second compares Intel SGX with the pure C
implementation. The results of the first tests are depicted in Figure 2.
Each point in the figure is calculated from 10 experiment runs. The
tests are split into two parts: on the left-hand side, it considered
that 10, 50, 100 and 200 meters (or measurements) would be aggre-
gated together to mask individual reads; on the right-hand side, the
experiments consider 200, 400, 800, and 1000 measurements.
The remaining experiments consider the proposed platform. The
smart meters were simulated from regular processes that would
connect to the MDC component (see Section 3.1 for details). The
experiments process up to 1 million measurements. Typically, two
curves or box plots are shown: one, described as SGX, illustrates
Figure 2: Example of HE vs. SGX.
Figure 3: Latency for an isolated publication.
executions where Intel SGX usage was enabled; the other, described
as regular considered executions in which SGX is disabled in the
trusted components. In both executions, SGX and regular, the com-
ponents use AES-CTR encryption for the measurement data sent
through the bus. For each scenario that considers a specific data rate,
the configurations were repeated 60 times. The CPU measurements
consider the usage of the SCBR processes.
In the experiment depicted in Figure 3 the systemwas under very
light load. A single measurement was published each second. In this
scenario, it is possible to see that the latency for publishing a single
measurement, passing through a message bus in the same physical
host is not statistically different between the two configurations.
We can also see that the higher latency value is similar for both
configurations, meaning the worst case scenario when using SGX
also happens without it.
Next, because experiments considering one isolated measure-
ment might not be representative for more complex execution
scenarios, we analyzed the system’s behavior under a heavier load,
processing a burst of 1 million publications from a single producer.
Figure 4: Latency for a burst of 1 million publications.
Figure 4 depicts the first 15 seconds of execution. The latency for
publishing the measurement passing through SCBR shows an in-
creasing behavior in the beginning of the execution, which means
the message bus receives as many measurements as possible until
its internal queues are full. From that moment on, we see only a
small variance in latency, between 900 and 1000 milliseconds. This
can be explained as a type of back-pressure mechanism, which in
our case means the bus causes the transmitting device to hold off on
sending data packets until the bus’s bottleneck has been eliminated.
We can see that such condition happens in both configurations,
only in different moments, happening a slightly earlier when using
SGX. After the bus’ saturation occurs, the latency for both cases is
similar.
Considering the same heavy load scenario of processing a burst
of 1 million publications, Figure 5 shows that the CPU usage main-
tains the mean identified for the higher power consumption publi-
cation rate, which is around 20000measurements/s , for both con-
figurations (as will be detailed shortly). We can also see that in a
regular scenario, the time to process all the publications is around
Figure 5: CPU usage for a burst of 1 million publications.
Figure 6: Latency for specific measurements rates.
53 seconds, which is smaller then when SGX is being used. Seven
seconds later, in case SGX is enabled, the processes are finished.
Experiments considering a variation of publication rates can be
seen in Figures 6 and 7. Considered rates were 1000, 2500, 5000,
10000, 15000 and 20000 measurements per second, being the last
one the guaranteed number of publications processed in a second
without accumulated delays. In Figure 6, we see that only from
15000measurements/s the mean latency for both configurations
starts to differ considerably. For smaller rates, differences are barely
noticeable.
Figure 7 then depicts CPU consumption of the message bus. For
both configurations, the usage increases as the publication rates
increase. From the results we can see that there is no significantly
difference between regular scenarios and when using SGX.
Our last experiment depicts the behavior of the system in the
presence of periodic intense bursts of events. Each sub-figure of
Figure 8 depicts one step in the progression from executing exper-
iments with 1000 measurements/s , up to 20000 measurements/s ,
in each step we can see how the actual delay deviates from the
Figure 7: CPU usage for specific measurements rates.
ideal delay. For example, the ideal curve is depicted in red and is a
straight line with an 45 degree angle. For some publications rates,
the actual latency deviates from this perfect behavior.
Figure 8 depicts the executions in a 2-second time frame. This
value was chosen because it depicts two cycles, hinting the recur-
ring behavior, while not making the figure unreadable. We can see
that for rates up to 5000measurements/s , there is no significant
visible latency deviation, the lines almost overlap each other. From
10000measurements/s , we can identify a small latency when using
SGX, and more clearly for both configurations when considering
20000measurements/s .
5 RELATEDWORK
There is a number of prior works focusing on privacy-protecting
data dissemination in untrusted environments [9, 17, 28].We further
reviewed secure data dissemination solutions to understand its
contributions in the context of cloud computing, focused into two
fronts: privacy-preserving data and privacy-assured models for
smart metering.
In order to find a solution to address the weaknesses on data
exchange between cloud users and providers, the paper by Kom-
nunos and Junejo [18] proposes an encryption scheme which uses a
cipher-text policy to anonymize attributes behind the implementa-
tion of brokering services and, therefore, protects the data against
privacy attacks on cloud environments. The work does not consider
topics as trust and security issues from a user perspective and its
effects when defining data privacy policies.
The authors in [16] propose a Privacy-as-a-Service model, de-
fined as a set of security protocols to provide a trusted environment
that protects confidential data from unauthorized access in cloud in-
frastructures. The authors argue that cryptographic co-processors,
used in their solution, demand high resource requirements, and
this might be an expensive cost for the privacy gain they offer.
In [13], the authors presented a trustworthy system relying on
an additive homomorphic encryption to ensure the privacy in smart
metering infrastructure. The encryption scheme implements a mod-
ular addition operation by using shared keys and provides exchange
Figure 8: Detailed latency considering a variation of measurements rates.
random measurements among smart meters and utility suppliers.
The protocols proposed could be archived using inexpensive smart
cards. However, the aggregator must be previously attested to guar-
antee a trusted service.
Due to the high calculation cost of homomorphic encryption in
data aggregation models, the solution in [27] proposes to perform
data mining from secured data avoiding the need of users’ secret
key to access confidential aggregation of cloud users. The Privacy
Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) technique satisfies the privacy
of information stored in the cloud by the granularity level of the
aggregation measurements in accordance with the level of secret
key carried out of the service providers.
Another proposal [24] makes use of Intel SGX technology to
provide a simple solution for privacy-preserving smart metering
system. The authors have suggested a model designed by trusted
smart meter devices exchanging consumer’s measurements with
the trusted aggregator, performed inside an SGX enclave, among a
secure channel established during the attestation process.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a system that enables a data source
that produces sensitive data to control the usage of this data by
third parties. One application example is an Advanced Metering
Infrastructure, where sources produce detailed metering that may
reveal privacy-sensitive information such as consumer habits or, in
worst cases, even detailed activities (e.g., TV preferences). In this
example, the original data is consumed only by applications and
services with higher levels of trust. Among these trusted services,
there could be anonymizers and aggregators that reduce the sen-
sitivity of the data to make it consumable by less trusted services.
In contrast to other approaches such as homomorphic encryption,
our approach has a much lower overhead and can be more simply
applied. We demonstrated its usage and feasibility through a set
of experiments. As limitations, the approach depends on the usage
of a specific hardware-supported extension, Intel SGX, but which
is increasingly common in off-the-shelf machines. In addition, In-
tel also offers SGX virtualization by providing a modified KVM13,
capable of exposing SGX features of hosts to guest VMs, letting
users have access to a preallocated EPC memory size. Virtualiza-
tion support considerably reduces the obstacles of putting SGX
support for cloud-based VMs. We have successfully configured this
upstream KVM in OpenStack, the most-used open-source cloud
management platform. Finally, our approach also does not protect
against software bugs that could reveal or leak data.
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